

iMMAP Somalia

Mine Action Data Brief Protection Cluster

August 2026





About iMMAP

iMMAP is a US-based nonprofit that helps humanitarian and development organizations make sense of their data – turning raw information into better decisions and more effective help for the people who need it most.



**Better Data
Better Decisions
Better Outcomes**



Surge Support

Fast-deployed expert teams when a crisis demands it



Long-Term Agreements

Sustained partnerships with humanitarian agencies



Information Support Teams

Embedded data specialists working inside partner operations



Mine Action

The focus of this programme – and this brief



The Project

This MACM III programme — is a **Netherlands MFA** initiative to strengthen, Somalia's national mine action authority (NMAA), build the systems and skills to manage explosive hazards on its own according to international standards.

About SEMA

Somalia Explosive Management Authority is the national mine action authority responsible for strengthening and improving coordination of mine action programmes, relevant information management, and reducing the impact of explosive hazards on people, services, livelihoods, and development.

1

Institutional Capacity Strengthening

Somalia's NMAA capacity to manage and coordinate mine action in accordance with international standards reinforces national ownership and sustainability.

Improving Public safety

2

Improving the security of people by reducing the risks of explosive remnants of war and taking care of survivors' needs, thus contributing to stabilization and enabling socio-economic development.



01. Explosive Ordnance Risk in Somalia

National figures, hazard geography, and who is exposed



PURPOSE & METHOD

Why This Brief, and How It Was Built



Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Netherlands

Why This Brief

Somalia's explosive-hazard data and its protection data have mostly lived in separate systems — SEMA tracks clearance and survey; protection actors track displacement, casualties, and access constraints. This brief brings both together in one place, so the Protection Cluster can prioritize by evidence: where hazards concentrate, who they affect, and where prevention isn't keeping pace.

How the Data Was Collected

Field teams — SEMA and partners including HALO, NPA, MAG and UNMAS — log every clearance task, survey, and risk-education session directly into IMSMA, Somalia's national mine-action database, capturing GPS location and basic demographic detail at the point of activity, not after the fact.

How It Was Analyzed

Combined

Merged 8 linked database tables plus Somalia's official Article 7 treaty submission into one consistent view.

Mapped

Plotted GPS coordinates directly to build hotspot and reach-gap maps, rather than relying on regional averages alone.

Compared

Measured each region's share of hazard tasks against its share of prevention reach, to see where the two are out of balance.

Cross-checked

Checked database totals against the official national figures and flagged where and why they diverge.



National Snapshot



Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands

REPORTING PERIOD: 1 JANUARY – 31 DECEMBER 2025 · SUBMITTED BY SEMA TO THE ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE BAN CONVENTION

507

Hazard areas nationally
(235 CHA + 272 SHA), 116.3M m²

3.91M m²

Land released to communities
in 2025

9,955

Explosive devices destroyed
in 2025

24,835

EORE beneficiaries reached
in 2025

2025 CIVILIAN CASUALTIES: TWO VERY DIFFERENT THREAT PICTURES



3

Mine / ERW casualties
(legacy contamination, accidental)



350

IED civilian casualties (241 injured + 109 killed)

concentrated in Banaadir and Hiiraan

Over 100x more civilians were harmed by IEDs than by mine/ERW accidents in the same year – the two require distinct protection responses.

Source: Somalia Article 7 Report 2025 – treated as the authoritative source for national-level totals in this brief; the underlying operational database (clearance, risk-education, and victim records) below provides multi-year regional detail and does not always cover the same time window.



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DIRECT & INDIRECT BENEFICIARIES

Population at Risk



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
127,082

(persons directly affected by the hazards)

265,737

(wider community indirectly impacted by the hazards)

Direct Beneficiaries/impacted by Sex & Age



Reporting Gaps



Disability status was recorded in just 31 of 11,233 records (0.3%) – far too little to say anything reliable about people with disabilities.



IDP-specific indirect-beneficiary field is entirely empty, despite 6,884 tasks flagged in newly settled communities.



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


WHERE HAZARD TASKS ARE CONCENTRATED

Geographic Distribution



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Galmudug alone accounts for 36% of all recorded tasks, followed by Banadir, Southwest and Hirshabelle – together over 78% of the caseload.



Use region-level concentration to prioritize joint risk-education and clearance planning with SEMA.




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
Where Explosive Ordnance Tasks Concentrate



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Tasks per ~11 km cell



11,228

Geolocated EOD tasks plotted

370

Distinct ~11 km hotspot cells

Galgaduud

Leading region – 2,521 tasks

984

Tasks in the densest single cell

Region shading is neutral – only red grid cells encode density.
Awdal, Togdheer, Woqooyi Galbeed & Middle Juba (dashed) carry no EOD records in this extract (Somaliland excluded).





HOW HAZARDOUS LAND GETS CHECKED AND CLEARED



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Confirmed vs. Suspected Hazard Areas

Survey teams walk and map a suspected hazard boundary on the ground, then classify it as a Confirmed Hazard Area (CHA – contamination verified) or a Suspected Hazard Area (SHA – not yet checked). This extract covers 169 surveyed areas.

72 CHA

Confirmed Hazard Areas
79.5 km² surveyed


96 SHA

Suspected Hazard Areas
94.7 km² surveyed

127 / 169

areas contain more than one
type of explosive hazard together

Status by Area Type



Still-suspected, not-yet-checked land is the largest single group (48 areas) – these are next in line for on-the-ground testing.



This extract's total (169 areas, 174.2 km²) does not match the official Article 7 national count (507 areas, 116.3 km²) – they were pulled from the database at different times/scopes. Use the Article 7 figures for national totals.

02. Access, Infrastructure & Threat

What clearance is restoring, and what kind of ordnance it involves



HAZARDS RESTRICTING CIVILIAN ACCESS



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Access & Essential Services Impact



301

Agricultural land
blocked



193

Other infrastructure
blocked



144

Roads
blocked



59

Water access
blocked



21.4% of hazard tasks (2,408 records) were reported in areas with active fighting

Explosive contamination compounds rather than substitutes for conflict-related protection risk in a fifth of recorded locations, reinforcing the case for joint Protection/Mine Action risk analysis.



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


WHERE HAZARDS SIT RELATIVE TO COMMUNITY LIFE

Proximity to Civilian Infrastructure



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221 tasks sit at schools or madrassas – direct child-protection relevance.



157 tasks near IDP/refugee camps – overlay against displacement site lists.



Only 30 tasks logged at health facilities – likely undercounted, since this category may be too narrow to catch every clinic.



Community centers + residences make up 60% of tasks near named infrastructure.



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WHAT KIND OF HAZARD IS BEING CLEARED

Threat Type & Severity




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94.7%

of tasks are Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) – 10,635 of 10,777 classified records

Higher-Severity Minority Categories (0.9% combined)



Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) dominates the caseload

10,635 tasks (94.7%) – typically legacy munitions, mortars, and ordnance remnants rather than emplaced mines.



Anti-personnel (AP) & anti-tank mines (AT) are a small but higher-severity share

98 combined records (0.9%) – far fewer than UXO, but they matter disproportionately for survivor support and risk-education targeting.



"Mixed" contamination sites (42 records) warrant closer technical survey

co-located threat types typically mean longer clearance timelines and elevated civilian risk during the interim.



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


Ordnance-Type Detail




Each clearance task can involve multiple items. This detail record lists 138,704 individual items across 18,337 entries — only 47% (5,039) link back to a task in this extract, so treat these item counts as a partial sample, not a full inventory.

Category of Ordnance (record count)



Categories follow SEMA's own database classification — check with SEMA to confirm exact definitions (e.g. "FFE") before quoting externally.

Disposal Action Taken (record count)



Sub-Category (top 5)

Projectile	7,495
Rocket	1,968
Small-arms ammo	1,931
Grenade	1,760
Mortar	1,665



Devices destroyed (2025): 9,955 in a single calendar year — vs. 138,704 items in this multi-year database. Different time windows; do not add them together.

03. Response, Prevention & Impact

Clearance caseload, risk education reach, and casualties



Response Caseload




Task Status


95.1%

of tasks are closed – 10,682 of 11,233

Still-Open & Cancelled Caseload (4.9%)



Caseload by Implementing Partner (top 7)



Note: The HALO Trust is the only clearance operator currently



Prevention & Outreach



24,835

Official EORE beneficiaries, 2025 (Article 7)


2.13M

Beneficiaries in the full database,
2008-2026


128,097


Individual risk-education sessions logged in the
database

Who Delivers It (top orgs, all-time)




Who It Reaches (target audience, all-time)





Gap (percentage points)



Galgaduud

Largest gap — +13.9pp

Banadir

Best relative reach — -22.0pp

Gap = region's share of national EOD tasks minus its share of national EORE beneficiaries. Red pins mark the named localities with the highest gap concentration at ~11 km grid resolution. Bari, Nugaal, Sanaag & Mid. Shebelle: too few EOD tasks (<10) for a stable estimate.



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WHO IS BEING HARMED, AND HOW

Victim & Casualty Data



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927

Individual victim case records,
cumulative

717 / 209

Injured / killed
(1 unknown outcome)

75% / 22%

Male / female
(3% unknown)


93%

of cases occurred while hunting
activity



Where age could be derived (a 60-record sample), 83% of victims were under 18 – consistent with hunting, herding and play being the leading reported activities at time of incident.

2025 Civilian IED Casualties by Region (official, Article 7)



Hiiraan is the outlier: 42 killed to 47 injured – almost as many deaths as injuries, versus Banaadir's 33 deaths to 109 injuries. The same casualty count can mean very different severity from region to region.



Case-level fields (displacement status, EORE exposure, danger awareness) are populated in under 10% of the 927 victim records – too sparse for sub-group targeting today.



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


REPORTED TASKS BY YEAR, 2010–2025

Temporal Trend



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2013 recorded the highest single-year caseload (1,859 tasks). Excluded: 15 sparse records from 2005–2009 and 40 records dated 2026 — the latter fall after the reporting period and should be verified with SEMA as likely data-entry errors before use in external products.



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WHAT STANDS IN THE WAY

The Challenges



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Data Accessibility

Clearance and survey records aren't consistently accessible or shared across partner organizations, slowing coordinated response.



Funding Issues

Inconsistent funding limits long-term planning, staff retention, and SEMA's ability to scale up national coverage.



IED Data Isn't in the National Database

Improvised explosive devices aren't yet captured in IMSMA Core — so the fastest-growing civilian threat sits outside the national mine-action dataset.



Data completeness & quality

Missing/inconsistently populated demographic and protection-relevant fields limit disaggregation and targeting



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Thank You

Headquarters Washington office
RRB/ITC 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Suite 470
Washington, D.C. 20004 USA
contact@immap.org

Disclaimer

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The information presented reflects operational data available to SEMA at the time of extraction and may be subject to ongoing validation, updates, reporting limitations, and variations in partner reporting coverage. Maps, hotspot analyses, and severity indicators are intended to support prioritisation and situational awareness and should not be interpreted as definitive measurements of contamination extent or humanitarian risk.



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